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Abstract
We analyze a dynamic, decentralized market with endogenous entry, where in each
period the active professionals supply one unit of an indivisible service at varying degrees
of quality. The customers that have entered the market are randomly matched with the
active professionals and prices are set by (complete information) pair-wise bargaining. In
its unique steady state, the market leads to an excess diversity of quality and customers
may have to suﬀer costly delays. Notably, eﬃciency is not regained as per period delay
costs disappear. We also show that a professional college setting licensing rules will
improve welfare (and even Consumer Surplus), relative to the free market, whenever
the ineﬃciency is caused by a large enough excess supply.
1 Introduction
The services of architects, accountants, lawyers and other liberal professionals play a major
role in the performance of advanced industrialized economies. According to recent esti-
mates, professional services employ about 6.4% of the EU15 work-force and represent 10%
of overall high skill employment; in 2001 the sector had turnover of around 980 billion Eu-
ros and created around 500 billion Euros of total value added.1 Professional services are
∗We are grateful to Santi S´ anchez-Pag´ es, Jonathan Thomas and seminar audiences at the Universities of
Cambridge, Dundee, Edinburgh, Leicester and Stirling, as well as at University College London for useful
comments. In´ es Moreno has provided invaluable help with the illustrations.
1See the report on Competition in Professional services COM (2004) 83.
1an intermediate input for many other activities, so that their quality and competitiveness
have major spill over eﬀects across the economy.2 Thus enhancing eﬃciency in markets for
professional services can go a long way in improving other industries’ competitiveness and
fostering growth.
The sector of professional business services is characterized by a very high level of regu-
lation. While speciﬁc regulations vary across countries and professions, quality standards,
advertising constraints, price limits or other controls are extensively imposed either by State
regulation or in the form of self-regulation by professional associations. However, the risk of
regulatory capture has been a major concern since Stigler (1971). It has been argued that
these arrangements raise prices and limit entry but fail to assure the appropriate quality
of service, opening an intense debate among policy-makers on (de-)regulation policies.3 In
fact, since the landmark ruling of the US Supreme Court in 1975 on Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar there is an ever increasingly active application of antitrust laws in the professional
services sector in all OECD countries.
The conventional wisdom argument about markets for professional services is based on
asymmetric information: if at the time of contracting the quality is not observable by the
customer, it actually may be the high quality services that are driven out of the market.4
Consequently, the main focus of policy debates is the correction of market failures due to
informational asymmetries, and arguments are often based on the presumption that – in the
absence of asymmetric information – a free market would perform eﬃciently. Asymmetric
information is an important problem indeed. However, we contend that when customers
can ascertain the quality of service before they purchase it, eﬃciency does not obtain either.
Consequently, arguments about (de-)regulation policies deserve further scrutiny, abstracting
from asymmetric information considerations.
2For example, according to recent estimate by the Italian Antitrust Authority, 6% of the costs in Italian
exporting ﬁrms are due to professional services.
3See the OECD DAFFE/CLP(2000)2 report on “Competition in professional services” for a host of
evidence on how anti-trust authorities have approached the issue in twelve countries in addition to the EU.
See also Paterson et al. (2003).
4Uncertainty about service quality (Arrow, 1963) and the resulting adverse selection (Leland, 1979,
Stiglitz, 1979, Wilson, 1979, 1980) and moral hazard (Shapiro, 1986) were modelled and understood some
time ago.
2In our model, the following fundamental features of markets for professional services
are assumed: First, trade is decentralized. We develop our arguments in the context of
a dynamic random matching market. Matching is random because we assume that the
customers cannot tell the professionals apart before they choose who to approach. In
other words, we model a market where reputation is not a major factor.5 In order to
focus on the issues beyond asymmetric information, we assume that customers learn the
quality of the service upon meeting a service provider. Second, the highly specialized and
personalized service requires that each supplier serve only one customer at a time (making
agreements on prices also bilateral). We model the resulting two-person bargaining with
complete information using a simple strategic model, which can also be interpreted as the
asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution.
We characterize the steady state of the market, and show that it leads to an ineﬃcient
outcome: there is an oversupply of (low) quality and in addition, for low enough delay
costs, a queue will form and customers will suﬀer costly delay. Not even the removal of the
per-period delay costs dissipates both these ineﬃciencies. While the quality distribution
does converge to the eﬃcient one, as the delay cost shrinks there is an ever larger queue of
customers waiting to be served and the aggregate waiting cost is increasing.
We also show that regulatory policies using a single policy tool (such as setting minimal
quality standards) can still only lead to second-best outcomes. Finally, we show that when
a profession is allowed to self-regulate, welfare (and even Consumer Surplus) is increased
relative to the a free market, whenever the ineﬃciency was caused by too many low quality
providers in the market.
Given the importance of the issues at hand, there is surprisingly little theoretical lit-
erature around on professional markets (apart from the asymmetric information literature
mentioned above). The inherently decentralized nature of the interaction has received little
attention. Helmut Bester (1988, 1993) was the ﬁrst to analyze a decentralized market with
vertically diﬀerentiated sellers. While his model is a clear forbearer of ours, he allows a
seller to sell to several buyers simultaneously and thus his model is not appropriate for
the professional services industry (indeed, he does not explore the issue of self-regulation).
5The alternative assumption of directed search is equally valid but necessitates a markedly diﬀerent
model.
3Recent contributions include Max Blouin (2003) who provides a simple model with no new
entry after the ﬁrst period. Rachel Kranton (2003) stresses the importance of competi-
tion between suppliers – and in general externalities among them – as an important factor
determining the choice of the quality produced. Steven Davis (2001) has a labor market ap-
plication within a search context. Finally, Morris Kleiner (2000) and Shirley Svorny (2000,
2004) provide some interesting survey results on licensing.
The rest of this article continues as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the details of
our model, provide the tools to evaluate welfare in the free market and under the diﬀerent
regulatory regimes and discuss the ﬁrst best allocation. Section 3 contains the analysis of
the market equilibrium and addresses comparative statics (illustrated with numerical ex-
amples), measuring the impact of changes in the level of frictions and in bargaining power.
We analyze the eﬀect of minimum quality standards (licensing) in Section 4. Section 5 con-
cludes. Appendix A discusses the interpretation of the concept of competitive equilibrium
in our market. The demonstrations omitted from the text are in Appendix B.
2 The model
We consider a market for a single commodity of heterogeneous quality, composed of a
set of service providers (sellers) and a set of customers (buyers).6 The market operates
over (discrete) time. Agents are risk neutral and maximize their (un-discounted) expected
utility. Trade is carried out by decentralized agreements between buyer-seller pairs that
meet randomly and negotiate the price to trade one unit of an indivisible good.
There is a continuum of buyers and sellers. The population of potential sellers is constant
and has measure 1. Each seller is uniquely indexed by her type, θ ∈ [0,1]. Seller θ can
produce a good of quality q(θ), where q(.) : [0,1] 7→ [0,1] is assumed to be increasing.7 For
simplicity, we also assume that q(.) is diﬀerentiable, q(0) = 0 and q(1) = 1. Note that q(.)
can also be thought of as the inverse of the distribution function of quality. We denote
the average quality in the market when only goods above quality q(θ∗) are produced by
6While our principal application is professional services, we will stick to the standard terminology of
sellers and buyers (of goods).
7Note that it would be without loss of generality to assume that it is non-decreasing. We assume strict





Each seller can produce a single unit – which cannot be stored – in each period. The
cost of production is independent of the quality8 and it is normalized to zero. We also
assume, for simplicity, that the sellers’ human capital is fully speciﬁc to the market, and
thus their opportunity cost of being in the market is zero. Sellers who (rationally) expect
not to be able to sell at a positive price are supposed not to be present in the (steady state)
market. Since a higher quality seller who trades can always do better than a lower quality
one, the active sellers form an interval: (θ∗,1].
In every period a measure 1 of new potential buyers appear. Before entering the mar-
ket, these buyers are heterogeneous in terms of their outside opportunities,9 which are
distributed according to the (strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable) distribution function
E(.) : [−∞,1] → [0,1].10 They must decide whether to enter the market. If they don’t,
they take up their outside option and exit the model. As a result, the ﬂow of buyers en-
tering the market in each period is E(.) evaluated at the expected proﬁt of a buyer upon




xdE(x) < ∞, that is, the aggregate “opportunity beneﬁt” of the buyers
entering in a given period is ﬁnite.11 In order to inform our intuition, it will be useful as
we proceed to consider the homogeneous case of completely inelastic entry as well, where
a measure e < 1 of buyers enter each period (and suﬀer no opportunity cost). Once in the
market, all buyers are identical: they wish to purchase a single unit of the good and their
valuation of the good oﬀered by seller θ is equal to its quality, q(θ). In every period that a
buyer is in the market but does not get served he suﬀers a cost, c ∈ (0,1].
In every period, traders seeking a match meet at random. We denote the probabilities
of ﬁnding a trading counterpart by πb and πs for buyers and sellers, respectively. These
probabilities depend on the state of the market, denoted by (θ∗,b∗). θ∗ is the marginal seller
8Since one of our claims is that too much of mediocre quality is produced in equilibrium, by not giving
mediocre producers a cost advantage, we actually strengthen our result.
9Alternatively, travel costs, either literally or in the sense of Hotelling.
10The presence of a positive measure of buyers with (very) negative opportunity costs is not absolutely
necessary. However, otherwise for some parameter values a steady state equilibrium would fail to exist (see
Subsection 3.1).
11Otherwise, welfare would be inﬁnite, independent of the market outcome.
5(so that 1− θ∗ is the measure of active sellers in the market), while b∗ is the measure of
buyers that seek a seller. There is eﬃcient,12 uniform random matching among the active












Once a buyer ﬁnds himself in a store, he learns the quality of the product oﬀered by the
seller. Next, they start bargaining over the price. Bargaining proceeds as follows. One of
the parties is randomly selected to make a proposal. The probability that the buyer (the
seller) is selected is λ ∈ (0,1) (respectively, 1 − λ). If the responder accepts the proposed
price, the transaction is consummated. The buyer then leaves the market, while the seller
can serve a new customer in the following period. If the responder rejects, then they break
up negotiations and both traders search for a new match in the following period.13
We are interested in characterizing the market in its steady state, that is, when the
measure of active traders in equilibrium, b∗ buyers and the sellers in (θ∗,1], is constant over
time. We will refer to such a situation as the market equilibrium.
2.1 Welfare
In this subsection we develop the (utilitarian) welfare function, which will enable us to
evaluate the eﬃciency of our market as well as to derive the optimal decisions of a (self-
)regulatory authority.
In equilibrium,14 the measure of active sellers in each period is 1−θ∗. Given the matching
technology, everyone on the short side of the market is matched in each period, so – since, as
we will see shortly, in equilibrium all matches end in trade – the measure of buyers entering
the market in its steady state is the same as the measure of trade, t∗ = min{b∗,1 − θ∗} in
each period.
12Considering the frictionless limit is for simplicity; our analysis can be extended to environments where
the matching technology displays search frictions.
13Note that this bargaining procedure is an equilibrium outcome in a much more elaborate model, where
following the random choice of the ﬁrst proposer, there is an alternating oﬀer bargaining game with either
player being able to leave the negotiating table following a rejection. See Ponsat´ ı and S´ akovics (1998).
14For ease of exposition, we deﬁne the welfare function directly for a market equilibrium.







Welfare per period is the realized surplus (quality weighted measure of trade) minus the
opportunity and waiting costs:15
W = t∗q(θ∗) −
Z t∗
0
E−1(x)dx − (b∗ − t∗)c. (1)
When entry is inelastic, there is no opportunity cost to worry about:
W(e) = eq(θ∗) − (b∗ − e)c.
The professional college’s objective function can be derived along the same lines as the
welfare function. Denote by p(θ) the expected price that prevails in the q(θ) bargaining







2.2 The eﬃcient outcome
As a benchmark, it is useful to characterize the welfare-maximizing allocation – attainable
under centralized trade with complete information – in our market.
Proposition 1 The unconstrained welfare maximizing allocation results in a balanced mar-
ket. The marginal trader, θc, is the solution of E (q(θc)) = 1 − θc, and 1 − θc buyers enter
in each period. For exogenous entry the optimal allocation is given by θc(e) = 1 − e.
Proof: See Appendix B. •
Quite intuitively, the ﬁrst best results in no idle traders, and the marginal consumer
having an opportunity cost which equals the quality (surplus) provided by the marginal





b∗, we have that per entrant the expected waiting cost is
b∗−t∗
t∗ c. Since there are t
∗ new entrants, the
aggregate cost of waiting is (b
∗ − t
∗)c. This is the same as the cost of waiting incurred by the currently
waiting buyers in any given period.
7seller. See Figure 1. Note that unlike in the usual graph, the vertical axis measures buyer’s
surplus, z := q(θ) − p(θ), rather than price. For a further elaboration on this, and on how
we can derive this “competitive” allocation from ﬁrst principles, see Appendix A.
Figure 1: Determining the buyer’s surplus in the competitive equilibrium.
3 The market equilibrium
The characterization of the market equilibrium requires the simultaneous determination of
the price distribution, p(.), the marginal quality, q(θ∗), and the measure of buyers active in
the market, b∗.
Consider a market equilibrium. Denote the expected surplus of a buyer upon entry by
xb. This variable is central to the analysis, as it impacts on the outcome of bargaining and
the entry decisions of traders on both sides of the market. The ﬁrst result we want to
establish is that every match will result in a trade. Note that, despite the fact that sellers
who (rationally) expect not to be able to trade do not participate in the matching, we could
have a situation where some buyers only agree to trade if they are chosen to make the ﬁrst
oﬀer – and otherwise they prefer to wait for a new match.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium every match results in trade. Moreover, the marginal quality is
given by
q(θ∗) = max{xb − c,0}. (2)
8Proof: By stationarity, the buyers’ outside option during bargaining is the same as
their expected surplus upon entry, but “discounted” by one period: xb−c. This determines
the marginal quality that is supplied in equilibrium, q(θ∗), in a straightforward way. Note
that no buyer will ever purchase from a seller that oﬀers a quality of q(θ) < xb − c, since
even trade at zero price – the lowest price a seller would accept – would yield less than
waiting for a rematch. Thus, potential sellers of quality below xb − c will not be active in
a market equilibrium. On the other hand, a situation where the marginal quality oﬀered
in the market is q(θ∗) > max{xb − c,0} cannot happen in a market equilibrium either.
Otherwise, potential sellers of quality q(θ), max{xb − c,0} < q(θ) < q(θ∗), would enter the
market and – if matched, which would happen with positive probability – make positive
proﬁts by trading at some expected price p ∈ (0,q(θ∗) − q(θ)), since any matched buyer
is strictly better oﬀ trading at such prices than not trading. Hence, in a market equilib-
rium q(θ∗) = max{xb − c,0}. This, in turn, implies that all matches end in trade, since for
θ0 > θ∗, both traders are happy to trade for any p ∈ (0,q(θ0) − q(θ∗)). •
The endogenous outside option of a buyer is equal to the expected proﬁts from a future
match, net of the expected cost of waiting for that match. For a buyer the expected value
attainable in future matches is independent of the quality of the good that he is currently
bargaining for. Instead, it is a function of the distribution of quality eﬀectively supplied in
the market, and it coincides with the “discounted” value of the expected payoﬀ of a buyer
upon entry, xb − c. Turning to the sellers, note that their outside option is zero, since the
future sales are independent of what happens in this period, and upon disagreement with
the buyer they are currently matched with, they have no further opportunity to sell in the
current period.
In order to derive the (expected) outcome of bargaining, observe that in equilibrium
all proposers oﬀer the price that leaves the responder indiﬀerent to his/her outside option.
Therefore, the expected equilibrium price (as a function of quality) is given by
p(θ) = (1 − λ)(q(θ) − xb + c). (3)





1 − θ∗ dθ + (1 − πb)(xb − c). (4)
To understand this equality, note that the buyer will either be matched and then obtains
the expected diﬀerence between the quality of good she will buy and the price she will pay
for it, or, she will be unmatched and will have to wait until next period to ﬁnd herself in
the same situation as now.
Substituting the price equation (3) into (4) and rearranging, we obtain16














Turning to the buyers’ entry decision, recall that in a steady state the measure of buyers
entering and leaving (trading) must be equal. By Lemma 1, all matches lead to an exit, so
the ﬂow of buyers through the market equals t∗. Thus, in general, E(xb) = t∗. Substituting






In order to simplify the analysis, we will assume that the distribution of quality is well-
behaved: We say that the quality distribution is regular if q0(θ) < q0(θ) for all θ ∈ [0,1]. A
suﬃcient17 condition for regularity is that q(.) is concave. Since q(.) is the inverse of the
distribution function of quality, this roughly says that we should not have too many low
quality potential sellers.
Let θb(λ,c) be the unique (guaranteed by regularity) solution to
λ[q(θ) − q(θ)] = c, (8)





πb , where the second term on the
right-hand side is the average price and the last term is the expected waiting cost of a new entrant.
17But, by far, not necessary: the uniform quality distribution satisﬁes regularity by a wide margin, as
q(θ) − q(θ) =
1−θ
2 .
10when it exists (that is, when q(0) ≥ c/λ), and zero otherwise. This equation determines the
marginal seller if the sellers’ entry decision turns out to be the binding constraint. Note that
in a buyers’ market (where buyers are the short side and, therefore, πb = 1) the left-hand
side is the expected gain to a buyer matched with the marginal seller from refusing to trade
and waiting for a rematch, while the right-hand side is the cost of switching. If the gain
were larger, then no buyer would be willing to trade with this seller, so she would not enter
the market. Similarly, deﬁne θs(c) as the unique solution to18
E(q(θ) + c) = 1 − θ. (9)
This equation determines the marginal seller if the buyers’ entry decision turns out to be
the binding constraint. The left-hand side gives us the measure of buyers willing to enter
as a function of the marginal quality and the waiting cost (c.f. (7)). The right-hand side is
the measure of active sellers, which in the market equilibrium has to equal the measure of
new buyers entering the market.
We are now ready to state our characterization theorem:
Theorem 1 Assume that q(.) is regular. Then there exists a unique market equilibrium.
i) When θb(λ,c) ≤ θs(c), in equilibrium buyers are the short side, the marginal seller is







ii) When θb(λ,c) ≥ θs(c), in equilibrium sellers are the short side, the marginal seller is
θs(c) and the measure of buyers in the market is bs = [q(θs) − q(θs)]
λ(1−θs)
c .
Proof: See Appendix B. •
Similar arguments lead to the characterization of the market equilibrium when entry is
exogenous:
Corollary 1 Let q(.) be regular and assume that buyers enter at a constant rate e. Then
there is a unique market equilibrium.
18To be rigorous, if we do not want to use the additional information that q(θ) + c ≤ 1 before solving the
equation, we need to extend the support of E(.) up to 2: E(x) ≡ 1 for x ∈ [1,2].
111. For small entry rates, e ∈ (0,1−θb], buyers are the short side (b = e) and the marginal
seller is θb(λ,c).
2. For larger entry rates, e ∈ (1 − θb,1), sellers are the short side (θ∗ = 1 − e) and the
measure of buyers in the market is b∗ = (q(1 − e) − q(1 − e)) λe
c .
3.1 The price distribution
In order to complete our description of the market equilibrium we need to establish how
the surplus generated by trade is shared. Putting (3) and (5) together, we obtain the price
distribution:




That is, expected prices are linearly increasing in quality, with zero – by (6) – being paid
for the good of the marginal producer (unless the marginal quality is zero, in which case




> 0).19 Consequently, the sellers do obtain the
share corresponding to their raw bargaining power, but not of the full surplus, rather of the
incremental surplus over the one provided by the marginal seller. This is consistent with
the fact that our bargaining equilibrium is equivalent to the (asymmetric) Nash Bargaining






the threat point and q(θ) the size of the bargaining surplus.20 See Figure 2.
Note that the price at all supramarginal sellers is decreasing in the marginal quality,
q(θ∗). In other words, increased competition – additional (though lower quality) sellers active
in the market – raises the prices earned by the incumbents. This is a direct consequence
of the fact that the sellers’ entry is endogenous, implying that the marginal seller must
expect zero in equilibrium, whoever she is. However, since the marginal quality is also
endogenously determined, this result should not be evaluated at its face value. We will
examine this question in more detail in Section 4, where we analyze the eﬀects of the







, the price charged may
exceed the quality provided. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the beneﬁt to a buyer from trade
is not just q(θ) but also the avoidance of the waiting cost. Of course, this can only happen in equilibrium
because, by assumption, there are buyers with negative enough opportunity costs who are still willing to
enter the market. If this were not the case, the market would fail for c/λ high enough.
20See Binmore et al. (1986) for a discussion of this equivalence.
12Figure 2: The Nash Bargaining Solution
introduction of a quality threshold – as a result of, say, occupational licensing – on the
market equilibrium.
Condition (10) also allows us to make our ﬁrst empirically relevant/testable observation.
Proposition 2 If some (none) of the sellers are inactive, the “price-quality ratio”,
p(θ)
q(θ), is
strictly increasing (decreasing) in the quality of the good traded.
Proof: From (10) it is immediate that
p(θ)
q(θ)








which – for λ ∈ (0,1) – is strictly increasing (decreasing) q(θ), as long as q(θ∗)− c
λπb > (<)0.
From (6), this corresponds to whether, the marginal quality is positive or zero. •
That is, the proportion of the gains from trade appropriated by the sellers is increasing
with the quality of their good as long as the buyers can expect a positive surplus. Since the
latter condition is usually satisﬁed, this implies that the mark-up is increasing with quality,
as is commonly observed. On the other hand, when the buyers expect a loss in the market
(even if a smaller loss than what they would suﬀer outside), the result is the opposite, the
13mark-up is decreasing with quality, as it is driven by a ﬁxed eﬀect. Again, this corresponds
to the small(er) price dispersion observed, say, for emergency plumbing services.
At this point an example is useful to illustrate the mechanics of the market equilibrium
and to preview the main points that we will be making in the sequel.
3.2 An Example
Consider a market where potential qualities are distributed uniformly in [0,1], i.e. q(θ) = θ,
and assume that entry is given by E(x) = 1
(2−x)2. The eﬃcient quality provision is given by
the solution to 1
(2−x)2 = 1 − x, that yields θc = .534. The ﬁrst best level of welfare is thus






.0 (2 − 1 √
x)dx = .357 + .434 =
.791.
Let us ﬁx the delay cost at, say, c = .1, and examine the market equilibrium for diﬀerent
values of the bargaining parameter λ. Equation (8) yields θb(c,λ) = 1− .2
λ, which is positive
for λ ≥ .2. Equation (9) yields θs(c) = .494, and 1 − .2
λ ≤ .494 if and only if λ ≤ .395.
Figure 3 displays θs and θb as a function of λ. Thus, for c = .1, the market equilibrium is
as follows:






2. For .2 < λ ≤ .395 not all potential sellers are active, θ∗ = 1 − .2
λ > 0, but buyers
continue to be the short side; b∗ =
10(1−λ)λ
1+9(1−λ)λ, and πs =
50(1−λ)λ2
1+9(1−λ)λ < 1.
3. For λ > .395 the marginal seller is θ∗ = .494, and sellers become the short side;
b∗ = 1.28λ and πb = .395
λ < 1.
The market equilibrium measures of active agents for each side of the market are dis-
played in Figure 4.
With these measures in hand, welfare, proﬁts and consumer surplus as a function of λ
are readily evaluated. The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 5 that presents
welfare, consumer surplus and proﬁts as a function of λ, and displays the ﬁrst best welfare
(top horizontal line). It is apparent that allocating all the bargaining power to one side of
14Figure 3: Marginal seller θ∗ as a function of λ; θb is the ﬂat line and θs is the increasing
curve.
Figure 4: Equilibrium measures of buyers, b∗ (continuous line), and sellers, 1 − θ∗ (dashed
line), as a function of λ
15the market is not eﬃcient. Furthermore, the maximum welfare (attained at the value of λ
which balances the market) still falls short of the ﬁrst best.
Figure 5: Welfare, consumer surplus and proﬁts (top, middle and bottom curves) as a
function of λ; the ﬂat line displays the ﬁrst best welfare.
Let us now ﬁx the bargaining power at, say, λ = 1/2, and examine the market equilib-
rium for varying levels of the delay cost c. Equation (8) yields θb(c,λ) = 1 − 4c, which is
positive for c ≤ 1/4. Equation (9) is now the cubic equation 1
(2−x−c)2 = 1 − x. Its unique
real solution, x(c), is displayed in Figure 6, along with 1 − 4c; observe that, x(c) crosses
1 − 4c from below at c = .129.
Figure 6: Marginal seller θ∗ as a function of c; θs(c) = x(c) ≤ θb(c) = 1 − 4c for c ≤ .129.
Thus, the market equilibrium for λ = 1/2 is as follows:
1. For c ≤ .129 sellers are the short side and the marginal seller is θ∗ = x(c); b∗ =
(1−x(c))2
2c
16and πb = 2c
1−x(c) < 1.
2. For .129 < c ≤ .25 buyers are the short side and the marginal seller is θ∗ = 1 − 4c;
b∗ = 1
(1+3c)2 and πs = 1
(1+3c)24c < 1.
3. For c > .25 buyers are the short side with all potential sellers active; b∗ = 1
(1.5+c)2 and
πs = b∗ < 1.
The measures of agents active on each side of the market as a function of c are displayed
in Figure 7. Note that, as c → 0, θ∗ → θc, b∗ → ∞ and πb → 0.
Figure 7: Measures of sellers, 1 − θ∗, and buyers, b∗, as a function of c.
Thus, as delay costs vanish, the provision of quality approaches the eﬃcient level. How-
ever, the measure of buyers that keeps the market at a steady state grows without bounds.
In fact, this increase in the queue is faster than the decrease in the search cost. Figure 8,
displays welfare, consumer surplus and proﬁts as a function of c, and relates them to the
ﬁrst best welfare; it is clear that eﬃciency is not attained in the limit. Indeed, at c = 0,
welfare, proﬁts and consumer surplus are all increasing in c! Again, the maximum welfare
– attained at the value of c which balances the market – still falls short of the ﬁrst best.
Before turning to the analysis of regulatory tools that might constrain and perhaps
correct the market performance, in the next subsections we will argue that the equilibrium
features and comparative statics displayed in this example hold in general.
17Figure 8: Welfare, consumer surplus and proﬁts (top, middle and bottom curves) as a
function of c; the ﬂat line displays the ﬁrst best welfare.
3.3 Delay costs
Let us ﬁrst investigate the behavior of the market equilibrium in general as the per period
cost of delay, c, varies.
Let us ﬁrst look at the imperfection caused indirectly by this friction: the deviation of
the quality provided by the market from the eﬃcient provision (given by the competitive
allocation derived in the Section 2.2). As expected, since frictions “lock buyers in”, the
market equilibrium always has too low marginal – and therefore average – quality. However,
as (per period) frictions disappear, we obtain the competitive allocation:
Proposition 3 The marginal quality in the market equilibrium is decreasing in c, 21 and in
the limit as (per period) frictions disappear, c = 0, it coincides with the competitive one.
Proof: Implicitly diﬀerentiating their deﬁning equalities, it is easy to see that both
θb(λ,c) and θs(c) are decreasing in c. Since limc→0 θb(λ,c) = 1 for all λ > 0 (even if q(.) is
not regular!)22, as c → 0 we always have a sellers’ market, and the marginal seller is θs(0),
which coincides with θc. •
21Until it reaches zero. From then on it is, obviously, constant.
22Note that this result does not require q(.) to be regular, since as c → 0 all the roots of q(θ) − q(θ) = c
converge to 1 anyway.
18It is important to observe that the convergence to the Walrasian outcome is not complete,
though. Notably, the price distribution in the “frictionless” market does not match that of
the competitive equilibrium. As we have seen, the latter leads to a constant buyer’s surplus:
q(θ) − pc(θ) ≡ q(θc), while the former is given by (7): p(θ) = (1 − λ)(q(θ) − q(θc)), which
leads to a buyer’s surplus increasing in quality: q(θ)−p(θ) = λq(θ)+(1 − λ)q(θc). Thus, the
competitive price distribution corresponds to the frictionless market price distribution where
almost all the bargaining power is given to the producers (λ ' 0). For λ > 0, the buyer’s
surplus is increasing in quality in the “frictionless” market equilibrium. This is at ﬁrst
blush surprising: if there are indeed no frictions, how come that a consumer matched with
the marginal seller does not refuse to trade and wait for a better match? The explanation
can be extracted from Theorem 1: the measure of buyers in the market, b∗, is increasing
without bound as the buyers become more and more patient. As a result, the probability
of getting rematched in the next period tends to zero as c tends to zero.
Consequently, we do not achieve an eﬃcient outcome even in the limit as (per period)
delay cost disappear: while the quality distribution and the measure of new buyers entering
the market are the same as in the competitive equilibrium, there exists an inﬁnite queue
and the buyers incur positive delay costs on average.
Actually, the limiting outcome is not only ineﬃcient, but it is not even second-best. To
see this, start by observing that once c is low enough to put us in a sellers’ market, the
expected payoﬀ of a buyer upon entry, xb, is increasing(!) in c.
Corollary 2 In a sellers’ market, the expected payoﬀ of a buyer upon entry, xb, is increas-





Proof: See Appendix B. •
That is, as c decreases, the eﬀect on buyers who are in a match and on those who are
not are divergent: while a buyer considering to leave the seller he is matched with will ﬁnd
it easier to switch (as expected), a buyer just entering the matching process will actually
face a more costly wait! This latter phenomenon opens the possibility of welfare being
increasing in the delay cost. That is, contrary to intuition, the more patient traders are in a
19decentralized market the lower welfare they might enjoy! This is exactly what is displayed
in Figure 8.
The explanation of the “paradox” has a taste of the tragedy of the commons: when
buyers decide to enter the queue they do not take into account the negative externality
imposed on the rest. As the cost of waiting decreases,23 during a transitory phase even
more buyers enter the market. However, as we have seen above, this is accompanied by a
decrease in the number of sellers, since now it is easier to switch away from a low quality
seller. As a result the queue grows larger, eventually dissuading entry suﬃciently so that it
stabilizes at the level of the sellers present in the market. This means that we end up with
fewer buyers entering per period than before, implying that the expected proﬁt upon entry
has decreased. Since prices have also decreased, the sellers are worse oﬀ as well. Thus –
since by Proposition 3 and the fact that b (and thus the amount of trade) is decreasing in c
when θb = 0, welfare is always decreasing in c in a buyers’ market as well – we have proved
that
Proposition 4 The delay cost that maximizes welfare is not 0. Rather, it is cw = E−1(1−
θb) − q(θb), the delay cost that equates the number of buyers and sellers in the market.
At ﬁrst blush, one might think that the above result is driven by the endogeneity of the
buyers’ entry process. However, this is not the case, as we show next.
When entry is exogenous, a decrease in the delay cost will, obviously, have no eﬀect
on entry. Instead, initially it will decrease the number of sellers, since now it is cheaper
to switch away from them. Since entry stays constant, this will result in a longer queue.
Eventually, the queue will be suﬃciently long, so that the expected payoﬀ upon switching is
the same as before and the marginal seller is the θ = 1−e, once more. What has happened
to welfare? Well, if xb−c stayed constant while c decreased, it must be the case that xb has
decreased. Since production and prices are unchanged, this implies that welfare has also
decreased. Consequently, Proposition 4 holds for exogenous entry as well.
Pulling all these results together, we can see that if the free market is a buyers’ market
then a regulator would like to decrease waiting costs, since that would have two beneﬁcial
eﬀects: it would increase the marginal quality and decrease the measure of idle sellers.
23In the classic commons example this would correspond to a lower (private) cost of maintaining a goat.
20On the other hand, if the free market is one where the consumers are queueing, then the
trade-oﬀ between improving the quality distribution and reducing waiting time is clearly
decided in favor of the latter. The importance of the cost of waiting in the evaluation of
social welfare is a recurrent and key observation in our analysis.
3.4 Bargaining power
When analyzing the eﬀects of the distribution of bargaining power, the key observation to
make is that for any interior values of the parameters, varying λ we can move the equilibrium
between a sellers’ and a buyers’ market. In a buyers’ market the marginal seller is increasing
in λ – since the higher the buyers’ bargaining power the better is their outside option – ,
while no queues are formed. Consequently, since the original level of marginal quality was
too low, an increase in λ will always lead to a welfare improvement. However, at some level
of λ the market will turn into a sellers’ market. In a sellers’ market we have the opposite
situation. The marginal seller is independent of λ, while the queue length is increasing in
it (since the better deal a buyer can get the more waiting he is willing to put up with).
Consequently, welfare is decreasing in λ. As a result, we have the following:
Proposition 5 The welfare maximizing (second best) bargaining power, λw, is the one
that leads to an equal number of buyers and sellers entering the market, if feasible: λw =
min{1, c
q(θs)−q(θs)} (or min{1, c
q(1−e)−q(1−e)}, for exogenous entry).
Propositions 4 and 5 are two sides of the same coin. Together they demonstrate that the
welfare function always has a type of contract curve (that is, a locus of maxima) in c-λ space
that forms a “ridge:” at any point along it welfare is maximized simultaneously24 in both
c and λ. This feature would indicate that the two “tools” are interchangeable. However,
the “ridge” also has the particularity that it can only “spend time” at one edge, the λ = 1
one. In other words, for any λ, we can ﬁnd a low enough c that puts us in a sellers’ market,
but not vice versa. This is illustrated in Figure 9 that displays the 3-dimensional picture of
welfare as a function of c and λ for the parameters of the example of section 3.2:
24Note that this does not imply that the level of welfare achieved along this curve is constant.
21Figure 9: Welfare as a function of c nd λ.
4 Licensing
In this section we analyze the distributive and welfare eﬀects of a minimal level of quality, q∗,
directly imposed by a (self-)regulator. Note that this quality threshold acts as a constraint
on the market and therefore it necessitates a re-examination of the equilibrium behavior of
the traders rather than “just” being a comparative statics exercise.
In Section 3 we have seen that not even the “frictionless” free market leads to the ﬁrst
best welfare. Since it does lead to the competitive level of quality supplied, this implies
that, as a second best, the most eﬃcient outcome in a “frictionless” market should involve
a somewhat diﬀerent marginal quality from the competitive one. Whether higher or lower,
depends on how the expected cost of waiting varies with the marginal consumer. This is
not obvious, since there are two eﬀects at work – in opposite directions. On the one hand,
increasing the marginal quality lowers the number of available sellers, so it increases the wait
for a match. On the other hand, such an increase also decreases the surplus, which makes
it possible to maintain the equilibrium entry rate with a shorter queue, which decreases the
wait for a match. How this trade-oﬀ is decided is the ﬁrst question we investigate.
Note that the expression for the buyers’ expected payoﬀ upon entry, (5), is not aﬀected
22by the quality threshold. On the other hand the marginal quality is now given by
q(θ∗) = max{q∗,xb − c,0}.
Assume that q∗ > max{xb−c,0}, so that the quality threshold is binding (otherwise, it has
no eﬀect on the market equilibrium), and let θ∗ = q−1(q∗). With a binding quality threshold
the identity of the sellers active in the market is directly driven by the constraint. Con-
sequently, the measure of buyers in the market is suﬃcient to characterize the equilibrium
allocation:
Proposition 6 When the quality threshold is binding, the measure of buyers in the market























Proof: See Appendix B. •
Turning to the price distribution, notice that it is still determined by (10). Using the
queue length given by Proposition 6 we obtain:
Corollary 3 In a sellers’ (buyers’) market, the prices at supramarginal sellers are increas-
ing (decreasing) in a binding quality threshold.
In a buyers’ market, a rise in the marginal – and therefore the average – quality im-
proves the buyers’ outside option, resulting in lower prices. In a sellers’ market there is a
countervailing eﬀect, which turns out to be the stronger one: the waiting time increases as
a result of the restriction in supply. Consequently, prices increase.
When entry is exogenous we cannot have a binding quality constraint in a sellers’ market,
since there would be too much entry for the market to stabilize. In a buyers’ market the
trades are completely determined by the two constraints:
Corollary 4 When the quality threshold is binding and entry is exogenous, the measure of
buyers in the market is b∗ = e, while the measure of sellers is 1 − θ∗ ≥ e.
Turning to the socially optimal quality constraint, we have that:
23Proposition 7 The welfare maximizing (binding) quality threshold is the one that equates
the measure of buyers and sellers, determined by:




for endogenous entry and θ∗ = θc(e) = 1 − e, for exogenous entry.
Proof: See Appendix B. •
In other words, when the unregulated market is a sellers’ market an imposed minimum
quality cannot improve welfare.25 This has the important implication that licensing cannot
alleviate the ineﬃciency caused by congestion (in a sellers’ market). On the other hand, if
the unregulated market is a buyers’ market then there is room for improvement.
When entry is endogenous, the optimal threshold will be strictly below θc. The distortion
from the competitive level of marginal quality is increasing in the friction (c) and decreasing
in the buyers’ bargaining power (λ). When entry is exogenous, we can obtain (full) eﬃciency
by imposing the optimal quality constraint.
In either scenario, if the regulator were able to set both the bargaining power and a
quality threshold, the ﬁrst best outcome could be guaranteed:26
Corollary 5 For any c ∈ (0,1], there exists a λ ∈ (0,1), such that setting the quality
threshold at the eﬃcient level the market equilibrium leads to the competitive outcome.
Proof: See Appendix B. •
When the (aggregate) proﬁt-maximizing college can set the quality standard, we have
that the quality threshold is determined independently of the bargaining powers:
Proposition 8 When entry is endogenous, the proﬁt maximizing quality threshold always
results in a sellers’ market. If interior, this marginal quality satisﬁes
q(θ∗) + c = E−1(1 − θ∗) − (1 − θ∗)
dE−1(1 − θ∗)
dθ∗ .
25Interestingly, a constraint imposing a maximum on the marginal quality would help, but it would be
rather diﬃcult to implement (possibly with a lower bound imposed on number of licensees?).
26Because of our restriction that the per period cost cannot exceed the maximum quality, setting the delay
cost (and the marginal quality) may not be suﬃcient to achieve the ﬁrst best.
24Proof: See Appendix B. •
Note that the second term on the right-hand side is positive, and that if it were zero,
the solution of the ﬁrst-order condition would coincide with the unregulated outcome. That
is, when the solution is interior, we have that self-regulation will be welfare improving as
long as – the unregulated outcome is a buyers’ market and – entry is not too inelastic.27 In
fact, for some environments the minimal quality set by the college can be beneﬁcial for the
buyers as well. Figure 10 displays welfare, consumer surplus and proﬁts (top, middle and
bottom curves) as a function of the minimum quality standard for an environment28 where
licensing by the college increases Consumer Surplus.
Figure 10: The proﬁt maximizing minimal quality can lead to an improvement for both
sides.
As we have seen above, exogenous entry is not compatible with a binding quality con-
straint in a sellers’ market. Since in a buyers’ market prices are decreasing, while the
amount of trade stays constant, have that
Corollary 6 When entry is exogenous, the college prefers not to impose a quality threshold.
Proof: See Appendix B. •
27In this latter case, the marginal quality may be set so high that welfare is below the one that would
result in the unregulated market.
28The corresponding parameters are: c = .2, λ = .5, E(x) = 1/(2 − x)
5, q(θ) = θ.
255 Conclusions
We have shown that in a decentralized market for professional services there is a need for
public intervention even in the absence of asymmetric information about the quality at the
point of service. The equilibrium outcome involves excess supply (too low marginal quality)
and possibly excess demand (queuing customers) relative to the ﬁrst best. As excess demand
is inversely proportional to the unit cost of delay, the ineﬃciency is robust to the elimination
of frictions (delay costs): while excess supply disappears, we have permanent excess demand
in the limit.
From a welfare maximizing point of view, the avoidance of delay costs turns out to be
more important than the optimal quality mix being provided. Thus, the optimal quality
threshold will never increase the queues even if that would result in a better quality distri-
bution. Since the queue increases in the quality threshold, this also means that if there is
a queue in the unregulated market, minimum quality standards will not be able to improve
welfare. Under self-regulation, since the professional college is only indirectly aﬀected by
the queuing costs it restricts entry excessively compared to the social optimum (thereby,
in general, creating queues), however not necessarily relative to the unregulated outcome.
The more elastic is the consumers’ entry condition (distribution of opportunity costs) the
better is the college’s optimal decision for welfare.29
For brevity’s sake, we have not analyzed a number of additional regulatory tools. For
example, we have not analyzed the eﬀects of price ﬁxing. It is rather straightforward that
if it were feasible to set a price schedule then p(θ) = q(θ) − q(θc) would guarantee the
ﬁrst best. However, in practice it is not realistic to assume that such a price schedule can
be implemented. A constant price imposed on the entire market should still lead to an
improvement as forcing the price to be the same at all sellers gives a stronger incentive to
switch away from a low quality seller, thereby increasing the marginal quality.
Other interesting generalizations include the case where the opportunity cost of the
sellers is positive – capturing the eﬀect of a costly investment (training) – or the eﬀects
of a license fee either imposed on everyone or on newcomers only. Our model is clearly
29Note that, if the bargaining took place under asymmetric information, the college would have an addi-
tional reason to increase licensing standards, so the social value of self-regulation would be further increased.
26well-suited as a workhorse for such further analyses.
6 Appendix A
In order to provide further insight, we would like to arrive at the competitive allocation
from ﬁrst principles as well. In the current context, this is non-trivial for two reasons.
First, since our set-up is dynamic – where in each period new participants enter the
market –, in order to construct supply and demand we cannot just take a snapshot of the
stock of traders present in the market. Rather, we have to look at all the traders who could
potentially enter the market at any point in time.30 By stationarity, and following Gale
(1987), the maximizer of the discounted sum of surplus is the same as that of the (per-
period) ﬂow of potential traders. In our model the demand ﬂow is given by the new buyers
who could potentially enter in each period, while the supply ﬂow is given by all the sellers
who could potentially produce in each period. That is, we can identify the competitive
allocation by looking at the demand and supply that is newly generated in each period.
The second diﬃculty stems from the fact that we are not dealing with a homogeneous
good, rather with a (vertically) diﬀerentiated one. As a result, the Law of One Price
turns into the Law of One Surplus: Since the products are diﬀerentiated, consumers do
not simply compare prices when deciding which seller to buy from. Rather, they evaluate
diﬀerent products according to the surplus they can obtain from their consumption.31 Thus,
in a competitive market it is the buyer’s surplus available, which determines both whether
a buyer enters the market, and if yes, from which seller does he purchase. Then in a
competitive equilibrium, we must have – for the usual reasons – the buyer’s surplus, z(θ) =
q(θ)−p(θ), constant across sellers. Thus, the quantity demanded (per period) – as a function
of the “market buyer’s surplus” – is E (z). The supply function – again as a function of z
– can be constructed from the constraint that no seller would be willing to sell below cost,
that is, we must have q(θ) ≥ z for each active seller. This implies that if they have to
oﬀer z to the consumers, only sellers above θ = q−1(z) will be willing to sell, leading to a
30Strictly speaking, what we need to look at is the (discounted) “sum” of potential entrants.
31Given the indivisibility inherent in a service being provided, we cannot remedy this problem by simply
converting to a unit price of quality.
27supply of 1−q−1(z). Inverting supply and demand the Marshallian way, we obtain that the
quantity traded (per period) in the competitive equilibrium, Q, solves q(1 − Q) = E−1(Q),
which yields the marginal trader, θc, as the solution to q(θc) = E−1(1 − θc), just as when
we directly maximize welfare (in Proposition 1). Finally, note that the Walrasian buyer’s
surplus equals the marginal quality, z = q(θc).
7 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1:
Assume t∗ = b∗. Then (1) is clearly increasing in θ∗, so at the optimum b∗ = 1 − θ∗.
Similarly, if t∗ = 1 − θ∗ (1) decreasing in b∗ so at the optimum b∗ = 1 − θ∗. Consequently,
at the optimum we must have t∗ = b∗ = 1−θ∗. Substituting in and diﬀerentiating (1) with
respect to θ∗ we obtain the ﬁrst-order condition
−q(θ∗) + (1 − θ∗)q0(θ∗) + E−1 (1 − θ∗) = 0.
Noting that q0(θ∗) =
q(θ∗)−q(θ∗)
1−θ∗ yields
E−1 (1 − θ∗) = q(θ∗)
as claimed (the second-order condition is trivially satisﬁed).
When entry is exogenous, we have the feasibility constraints that e ≤ b∗ and e ≤ 1−θ∗.
Since W(e) is increasing in θ∗ and decreasing in b∗ the result follows. •
Proof: Let us look at the two possible market scenarios – buyers’ and sellers’ markets
– separately.
Sellers are the short side:b ≥ 1 − θ∗ = t∗.
In this scenario (7) implies that32 E(q(θs) + c) = 1 − θs, which – as we have seen
above – has θs(c) as its unique solution. Using this equation and substituting (5) into
E(xb) = t∗ = 1 − θ∗ we have




32Note that if q(θ
∗) were 0, then (7) would imply that E
−1(1)−c ≤ 0. Since E
−1(1) = 1 this is equivalent
to c ≤ 1. Therefore, 1 ≥ c implies that we need not take the positive parts in (7).
28In a sellers’ market, buyers are not always matched: πb = 1−θs
bs < 1. Substituting in, we
obtain
q(θs) + c = q(θs) −
c(bs − λ(1 − θs))
λ(1 − θs)
.
Solving for bs, we obtain




Recall that the sellers’ market solution obtains if and only if bs ≥ 1 − θs. It is easy to see
that λ[q(θs) − q(θs)] = c is the same as (12) with bs replaced by 1−θs. Therefore, since by
the regularity of q(.), q(θs) − q(θs) is decreasing in θs, bs ≥ 1 − θs if and only θs ≤ θb.
Buyers are the short side: b = t∗ ≤ 1 − θ∗.
Now all the buyers get matched in every period, so πb = 1. Substituting back into (6),





, which – as we have seen above – has θb(λ,c) as its








This equilibrium prevails if and only if bb ≤ 1−θb. When θb = 0, the inequality is satisﬁed,
since E(.) is a probability distribution function. Otherwise, by (6), q(θb)−
c(1−λ)
λ = q(θb)+
c, so bb = E(q(θb)+c). Recall that θs(c) denotes the unique solution to 1−θ = E(q(θ)+c).
Then, by the increasing nature of E(.) and q(.), we have that the buyers’ equilibrium exists
if and only if θb ≤ θs(c).•
Proof of Corollary 2:
From (5) we have that in a sellers’ market
xb = q(θs) −
c(b∗/(1 − θs) − λ)
λ
.
Substituting in for b∗ from Theorem 1 and simplifying, we obtain
xb = q(θs) + c.
Diﬀerentiating and calculating dθs






1 + q0(θs)E0(q(θs) + c)






1 + q0(θs)E0(q(θs) + c)
< 0.
•
Proof of Proposition 6:
Sellers are the short side: b∗ > 1 − θ∗ = E(xb).
In this scenario, πb ≡ 1−θ∗
b∗ . Moreover, xb = E−1(1 − θ∗). Equation (5) translates into
E−1(1 − θ∗) = q(θ∗) −
c(b∗ − λ(1 − θ∗))
λ(1 − θ∗)
.
Solving for b∗, we obtain
b∗ = λ(1 − θ∗)






Then we have that the sellers’ market solution obtains if and only if
1 − θ∗ < λ(1 − θ∗)






Buyers are the short side: b∗ = E(xb) ≤ 1 − θ∗.
In this case all the buyers get matched in every period, so πb ≡ 1. Substituting back to
(5), we obtain




For this to be the equilibrium we need




Notice that this inequality is the complement of (15).•
Proof of Proposition 7:
Note that there exists a threshold value of θ∗, such that below it we are in a buyers’
market while above it we are in a sellers’ market. Assume ﬁrst, that we are in a buyers’
market. From (1) we have that
dW







30The ﬁrst term is clearly positive, since the average quality is increasing in the marginal
one. Since we are in a buyers’ market E−1(b∗) is the expected surplus of a buyer, which
is less than the average quality as well (c.f. (16)). Consequently, all we need in order to
complete this part of the proof is to show that in a buyers’ market db∗
dθ∗ ≥ 0. That trivially
follows form Proposition 6, since both E(θ∗) and the average quality are increasing in θ∗.
Consequently, welfare is increasing in a (binding) quality constraint. That is, the planner
would like θ∗ as large as possible, while it still results in a buyers’ market.



















= (1 − θ∗)q0(θ∗) − q(θ∗) + E−1(1 − θ∗) − c(1 − λ) + λ
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(1 − θ∗)q0(θ∗) − q(θ∗) − c + E−1(1 − θ∗)

(1 − λ) −
λ(1 − θ∗)
E0 (E−1(1 − θ∗))
=

E−1(1 − θ∗) − q(θ∗) − c

(1 − λ) −
λ(1 − θ∗)
E0 (E−1(1 − θ∗))
,
where we have used that q0(θ∗) =
q(θ∗)−q(θ∗)
1−θ∗ . This derivative is clearly negative, since the
fact that the quality constraint is binding implies that the term in the square brackets is
negative.•
Proof of Corollary 5:
It is straightforward that if we set the quality threshold at the eﬃcient quality and the
market happens to clear in such a way that the measure of sellers and buyers in the market
is the same – and therefore there is no ineﬃciency caused either by waiting or by too low
demand – we have the ﬁrst best outcome. Consequently, all we need to prove is that it is
possible to set λ in order to ensure that the market indeed clears in that way. Recall that
the producer of the eﬃcient marginal quality – given by the solution to q(θ) = E−1(1−θ), –
is independent of both λ and c. On the other hand, by Proposition 6, we have a symmetric
market when E−1(1−θ∗) = q(θ∗)−
c(1−λ)
λ . Using the equality deﬁning the optimal marginal
producer, means that we need q(θc) = q(θc)−
c(1−λ)
λ or q(θc)−q(θc) =
c(1−λ)
λ . The left-hand
side of this last equation is a number in (0,1). Thus the proof boils down to showing that
31for any c ∈ (0,1], any number in (0,1) can be achieved by a judiciously choosing a λ ∈ [0,1].
This is indeed the case, since 1−λ
λ is decreasing from ∞ to 1 in λ.•
Proof of Proposition 8:




[q(θ) − xb + c] dθ. Recall that xb = E−1(1 − θ∗). Substituting into the proﬁt function
and diﬀerentiating, we obtain the ﬁrst-order condition.















q(θ) − q(θ∗) + c
λ
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Since the average quality is increasing in the marginal producer, the college will never want
to be in a buyers’ market.•
Proof of Corollary 6:
Aggregate proﬁts are given by
e












which is clearly constant in the marginal quality.•
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